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Abstract
We design simple mechanisms to approximate the Gains from Trade (GFT) in two-sided markets
with multiple unit-supply sellers and multiple unit-demand buyers. A classical impossibility result by
Myerson and Satterthwaite [22] showed that even with only one seller and one buyer, no Individually
Rational (IR), Bayesian Incentive Compatible (BIC) and Budget-Balanced (BB) mechanism can achieve
full GFT (trade whenever buyer’s value is higher than the seller’s cost). On the other hand, they proposed
the “second-best” mechanism that maximizes the GFT subject to IR, BIC and BB constraints, which is
unfortunately rather complex for even the single-seller single-buyer case. Our mechanism is simple, IR,
BIC and BB, and achieves 12 of the optimal GFT among all IR, BIC and BB mechanisms. Our result holds
for arbitrary distributions of the buyers’ and sellers’ values and can accommodate any downward-closed
feasibility constraints over the allocations. The analysis of our mechanism is facilitated by extending the
Cai-Weinberg-Devanur duality framework [4] to two-sided markets.
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1 Introduction
Mechanism Design for one-sided market has been extensively studied in Economics in the past few decades
and recently investigated in Computer Science. In a one-sided market, the mechanism aims to allocate the
items to agents and charge them payments so that (1) the agents are incentivized to reveal their true pref-
erences and (2) a certain objective is (approximately) optimized, e.g., social welfare and revenue. Various
beautiful results have been discovered building on the foundations laid by Vickrey and Myerson [25, 21]. In
the past few years, there has been increasing interest in understanding how to design mechanisms for two-
sided markets. In a two-sided market, the items are owned by a group of selfish agents known as sellers who
form one side of the market, and the other side of the market – the buyers wish to purchase the items from
the sellers. Sellers have values for the items that they own and buyers have values for items that are on the
market. Both sides are assumed to act strategically in order to maximize their utilities. The goal is to design
a mechanism to facilitate trade between the two groups and optimize a certain objective, e.g., efficiency.
Usually, the two-sided market is studied in the Bayesian model, where we assume that both the buyers’ and
sellers’ values are drawn from some known distributions. The major difference between one-sided markets
and two-sided markets is that all items can be viewed as owned by the mechanism in one-sided markets,
thus the mechanism does not need to handle the strategic behavior from the seller side.
The interest on two-sided markets can largely be attributed to many important applications, such as stock
exchange, online ad exchange platforms (e.g., Google’s Doubleclick, Micorosoft’s AdECN. etc.) where
advertisers try to purchase ad slots from websites who wish to sell the slots, the FCC Spectrum Auction
where the telecommunication companies try to purchase spectrum from television broadcasting companies,
online market places (e.g., Amazon, eBay etc.) where buyers and sellers trade on the large-scaled trading
platforms, and Uber where passengers try to book trips provided by Uber drivers.
Another crucial difference between one-sided markets and two-sided markets is that the mechanisms are
usually required to be budget-balanced in two-sided markets. Namely, the mechanism should not gain or lose
any money from the market. This is usually referred as Strong Budget Balance (SBB). A relaxed version of
this definition is called Weak Budget Balance (WBB), where we only need to make sure that the mechanism
does not inject money into the market. An even weaker definition known as Ex-ante Weak Budget Balance
(ex-ante WBB) only requires the expected sum of payments collected from the buyers is no less than the
expected sum of the sellers’ gains. All variants of the Budget Balance constraint are natural for two-sided
markets, however, adding such a constraint greatly increases the difficulty of designing mechanisms. The
simplest two-sided market is usually referred to as the bilateral trading, in which there is a single seller
who owns an item and there is a single buyer who wants to purchase the item. Both the buyer and the
seller have quasi-linear utility functions, and the buyer’s value for the item b and the seller’s value s are
drawn independently from two known distributions DB and DS . Unfortunately, a classical impossibility
result by Myerson and Satterthwaite [22] stated that even in bilateral trading there is no Bayesian Incentive
Compatible (BIC), Individual Rational (IR), and ex-ante WBB mechanism that achieves full efficiency (trade
whenever the buyer’s value is higher than the seller’s value). In the same paper, Myerson and Satterthwaite
provided a mechanism that maximizes the efficiency among all mechanisms that are BIC and SBB1. This
is usually known as the ”second-best” mechanism. Unfortunately, even in the simple setting of bilateral
trading, the “second-best” mechanism has extremely complex allocation and price rules that are determined
by solving a system of differential equations that depend on the buyer’s and seller’s distributions. It is
difficult to imagine how to implement such a mechanism in practice.
1As it turns out (Theorem 2), under interim IR and BIC constraints, ex-ante WBB is equivalent to SBB. So their mechanism is
also optimal among all ex-ante WBB mechanisms.
1
Motivated by the aforementioned results, we aim to design simple IR, BIC and SBB mechanisms that
approximately maximizes efficiency in two-sided markets. There are two standard ways to measure effi-
ciency. The first one is the Social Welfare induced by the mechanism. The second one is the Gains from
Trade (GFT), which is the expected gain in the social welfare induced by the mechanism. For example, if
the buyer has value $5 for the item and the seller has value $3 and they decide to trade. The social welfare is
$5, while the GFT is $2. An astute reader might have already realized that any mechanism that maximizes
the social welfare necessarily also maximizes the GFT. However, the two objectives are rather different
regarding approximation. In the example above, the mechanism that does not trade still achieves a social
welfare of $3 which is 60% of the optimal social welfare, but the GFT of not trading is 0 which is not within
any constant factor of the optimal GFT. It is not hard to observe that any constant factor approximation of
GFT is necessarily a constant factor approximation of the social welfare, but the other direction does not
hold. In this sense, GFT is a more difficult objective to approximate and any approximation to GFT provides
a stronger guarantee to the efficiency. There are a few mechanisms that manage to provide constant factor
approximation to the social welfare in surprisingly broad settings [11, 9, 10, 2]. The results are sparser for
GFT, McAfee provided a simple mechanism for bilateral trading that achieves 12 of the optimal GFT if the
median of the buyer’s value is higher than the median of the seller’s value [18], and Blumrosen and Mizrahi
provided a simple mechanism for the same setting that achieves 1e of the optimal GFT if the buyer’s value
distribution has Monotone Hazard Rate (MHR).
1.1 Our Results and Techniques
In this paper, we provide simple mechanisms to approximate the optimal GFT obtainable by any IR, BIC
and ex-ante WBB mechanisms. We believe this paper has the following three major contributions.
1. We provide a simple IR, BIC and SBB mechanism that achieves at least 12 of the optimal GFT in
bilateral trading for arbitrary seller and buyer value distributions.
2. We extend the 2-approximation to the double auction settings with arbitrary downward-closed feasi-
bility constraints and arbitrary seller and buyer value distributions.
3. We demonstrate the applicability of the Cai-Devanur-Weinberg duality framework for two-sided mar-
kets. Although our results only concern single-dimensional settings, our duality based upper bound
can be easily extended to multi-dimensional settings.
In particular, for the bilateral trading setting, we consider the following two simple IR, BIC, SBB mech-
anisms and show that the better of the two achieves 12 of the optimal GFT.
• Seller-Offering Mechanism(SOM): The seller offers a take-it or leave-it price for the item to the
buyer. The buyer receives the item if she pays the offered price to the seller. Otherwise, the seller
keeps the item and no payment is transferred. The seller chooses the price that maximizes her expected
utility depending on her true value s and the distribution of the buyer’s value DB .
• Buyer-Offering Mechanism(BOM): The buyer offers a take-it or leave-it price for the item to the
seller. If the seller accepts the offered price, the buyer receives the item and pays the seller the offered
price. Otherwise, the seller keeps the item and no payment is transferred. The buyer chooses the price
that maximizes her expected utility depending on her true value b and the distribution of the seller’s
value DS .
2
Informal Theorem 1. For arbitrary buyer value distribution DB and seller value distribution DS , either
the SOM or the BOM achieves at least 12 of the optimal GFT obtainable by any IR, BIC and ex-ante WBB
mechanism in bilateral trading.
The SOM is proposed by Blumroson and Mizrahi [3], and the BOM is the same mechanism with the roles
of buyer and seller exchanged. Both mechanisms are BIC, and one might wonder whether it is possible to
use a Dominant Strategy Incentive Compatible (DSIC) mechanism to approximate the GFT. Unfortunately,
as shown by [2, 3], no IR, DSIC and SBB mechanism can achieve a constant fraction of the GFT2, so in
order to obtain a constant factor approximation for GFT one has to relax one of the three conditions. We
will see later that one can also use an IR, DSIC and ex-ante WBB mechanism to achieve a 2-approximation
to the optimal GFT.
We extend our result to a more general setting that is known as the double auction in the literature. In
a double auction, there is a single type of item on the market. The buyers each want a single copy of the
item and the sellers each own a single copy of the item. So, there is a single number associated with each
buyer or seller’s value. We assume that these values are all drawn independently from possibly different
distributions. Moreover, we allow any downward-closed feasibility constraint on which buyer-seller pairs
can trade. We show that for any double auction with arbitrary downward-closed feasibility constraint, one
of the two IR, DSIC, ex-ante WBB mechanisms achieves 12 of the optimal GFT obtainable by any IR, BIC
and ex-ante WBB mechanisms.
• Generalized Seller-Offering Mechanism (GSOM): Given value profile (b, s), assign weight ϕ˜i(bi)−
sj to the pair of buyer i and seller j, where ϕ˜i(·) is Myerson’s (ironed) virtual value function for buyer
i [21]. Find a maximum weight matching subject to the feasibility constraint between the sellers and
buyers according to the weights defined above. We use M1(b, s) to denote the maximum weight
matching3. For each (i, j) ∈ M1(b, s), buyer i trades with seller j. This allocation rule is monotone
and the buyer (or the seller) pays (or receives) the threshold payment.
• Generalized Buyer-Offering Mechanism (GBOM): Given value profile (b, s), assign weight bi −
τ˜j(sj) to the pair of buyer i and seller j, where τ˜j(·) is the (ironed) virtual value function for seller j4.
Find a maximum weight matching subject to the feasibility constraint between the sellers and buyers
according to the weights defined above. We useM2(b, s) to denote the maximum weight matching.
For each (i, j) ∈ M2(b, s), buyer i trades with seller j. This allocation rule is monotone and the
buyer (or the seller) pays (or receives) the threshold payment.
Informal Theorem 2. In any double auction with arbitrary buyer and seller value distributions and arbi-
trary downward-closed feasibility constraint F , both of GSOM and GBOM are IR, DSIC and ex-ante WBB.
Furthermore, the better of the two mechanisms above achieves 12 of the optimal GFT obtainable by any IR,
BIC, ex-ante WBB mechanism.
2The original result was shown for the optimal GFT, but the result by Blumrosen and Mizrahi [3] implies that for the hard
instance the “second-best” mechanism achieves a constant fraction of the optimal GFT. Hence, this inapproximability result extends
to the best GFT obtainable by any IR, BIC and ex-ante WBB mechanisms.
3If there are multiple max weight matchings, we break ties lexicographically.
4 It has a similar form as the Myerson’s virtual value. Let fSj and F
S
j be the pdf and cdf for seller j’s value distribution, then
the virtual value of seller j is sj +
FSj (sj)
fSj (sj)
. If the virtual value function is not monotonically increasing, then we apply a procedure
similar to the one used in [21, 4] to iron it. See Lemma 2, 3 and Appendix A for more details.
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It turns out there exists a generic transformation (Theorem 2) that allows us to convert any IR, DSIC,
ex-ante WBB mechanism to an IR, BIC, SBB mechanism without hurting the GFT. By applying this trans-
formation to the GSOM and BSOM, we obtain the following theorem.
Informal Theorem 3. In any double auction with arbitrary buyer and seller value distributions and arbi-
trary downward-closed feasibility constraint F , we can design an IR, BIC, SBB mechanism that achieves 12
of the optimal GFT obtainable by any IR, BIC, ex-ante WBB mechanism.
Our result is facilitated by applying the Cai-Devanur-Weinberg duality framework to double auctions.
We first characterize the set of dual variables that has finite dual objective values as flows. For readers that
are familiar with the duality framework, this sounds rather similar to the one-sided market case. Indeed the
conclusion is quite similar, but the argument is different and requires us to observe a nice symmetry between
the sellers and buyers. From the duality, we obtained an upper bound for the optimal GFT obtainable by any
IR, BIC and ex-ante WBB mechanism. Interestingly, the upper bound has a natural format and suggests the
allocation rule of our simple mechanisms.
1.2 More Related Work
Our results are motivated by two different lines of work. The first one is designing simple and approxi-
mately revenue-optimal mechanisms in one-sided markets, where we have simple, deterministic and DSIC
mechanisms that achieve a constant fraction of the optimal revenue obtainable by any randomized and BIC
mechanisms in fairly general multi-dimensional settings [16, 7, 8, 15, 5, 17, 1, 27, 4, 6]. The second one
is designing mechanisms that approximates the GFT. The result presented in this paper is sparser and to
the best of our knowledge. [18] and [3] are the only two other papers that studied this problem. In both of
these papers, a constant factor approximation is obtained with respect to the optimal GFT in bilateral trading
(although not achievable by any IR, BIC, and WBB mechanism) by making assumptions on the buyer and
seller’s value distributions. Our result obtains a constant fraction of the GFT of the “second-best” mech-
anism, but does not rely on any assumption of the value distribution and generalizes nicely to the double
auction setting. It is shown by Blumrosen and Mizrahi that there is at least a constant gap between the GFT
of the “second-best” mechanism and the optimal GFT in bilateral trading [3] when the distribution is MHR,
the gap for general distributions remains open.
For the objective of social welfare, Duetting et al. [11] considered a setting similar to ours, where the
double auction can have matroid, knapsack and matching feasibility constraints over the set of buyer and
seller that can be involved in the trade. They proposed a modular approach based on the deferred-acceptance
heuristics from [20], and they obtain an IR, DSIC and WBB mechanism that achieves a constant fraction
of the optimal social welfare. Recently, Colini-Baldeschi et al. [9] showed how to design an IR, DSIC and
SBB mechanism for the same setting when the feasibility constraint is a matroid constraint. Blumrosen
and Dobzinski showed that a posted price mechanism achieves 1− 1e of optimal social welfare in dominant
strategies for the bilateral trading setting, and the result can be generalized to certain multi-dimensional
settings. Finally, Colini-Baldeschi et al. [10] considered a two-sided combinatorial auctions, where the
market has multiple types of items for sale. Each seller owns a few items and she has additive valuation over
her items. Every buyer has XOS valuation over the items. Rather surprisingly, they showed that a variant
of a sequential posted price mechanism can achieve a constant fraction of the optimal social welfare. The
mechanism is simple, IR, DSIC and SBB. A different line of work [26, 24, 19, 23, 14] showed that when
the two-sided market has symmetric sellers and symmetric buyers, then the inefficiency goes away quickly
in simple auctions, such as k-double-auction [24] and McAffee’s trade reduction mechanism [19], when the
market size grows large with symmetric sellers and symmetric buyers.
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Our proof is based on the Cai-Devanur-Weinberg duality framework, which has been used to address a
number of challenging problems in one-sided markets notably gives non-trivial upper bounds for a variety
of settings [4, 6, 13, 12]. Our paper provides an extension of the framework to two-sided markets.
2 Preliminaries
Two-sided Market Settings
We use m to denote the number of sellers and n to denote the number of buyers. For each seller
j (or buyer i), her type sj (or type bi), is drawn independently from her type distribution DSj (or D
B
i ).
Let DS = ×mj=1DSj and DB = ×ni=1DBi be the product distribution of sellers’ and buyers’ type profile
respectively. For notational convenience, let DS−j (or D
B
−i) be the distribution of types of all sellers (or
buyers) except j (or i). We use TSj (or T
S , TBi , T
B , TS−j , T
B
−i) and f
S
j (or f
S , fBi , f
B , fS−j , f
B
−i) to denote
the support and density function of DSj (or D
S , DSi , D
B, DS−j , D
B
−i). Let D = (D
S , DB).
Double Auction Settings
In this paper, we focus on a special case of two-sided markets – double auctions, where sellers are
unit-supply with homogeneous items and buyers are unit-demand. In other words, each seller only owns
one item, and each buyer only wishes to buy one item and treat all the items as the same. This is a single-
dimensional setting as every buyer’s or seller’s type can be represented as a single number. Let V =
{(i, j) | i ∈ [n], j ∈ [m]} be the set of all possible trading pairs between the sellers and buyers. We use
F ⊆ 2V to denote the feasibility constraint. More specifically, F is a set system that contains all of the
feasible sets of seller-buyer pairs that can be traded simultaneously. We allow any F that satisfies the
following two properties:
• Every S ∈ F is a matching, in other words, for every buyer i there is at most one seller j ∈ [m] such
that (i, j) ∈ S. Same for the sellers.
• F is downward closed, i.e., if S ∈ F , and S′ ⊆ S, then S′ ∈ F .
Mechanisms for Two-sided Markets
Any mechanism in two-sided markets can be specified as a tuple (A, pB, pS), where A represents the
allocation rule, pB and pS are the payment rule for buyers and sellers. Given a type profile s and b,
A(b, s) ∈ F is a (random) matching that contains all the pairs of sellers and buyers who trade with each
other under this type profile. In other words, for every pairs (i, j) ∈ A(b, s), buyer i receives the item
from seller j and pays pBi (b, s) to the mechanism. p
S
j (b, s) is the amount of money seller j gains from the
mechanism. For notational convenience, we slightly abuse notation to let pBi (bi) = Eb−i,s[pBi (bi, b−i, s)] be
buyer i’s expected payment when she reports type bi, over the randomness of mechanism and other agents’
types. Similarly, let pSj (sj) be seller j’s expected gains when she reports type sj .
In our analysis, we usually use an alternative representation of the allocation rule. For any type profile b
and s, for every i ∈ [n], we use xBi (b, s) to denote the probability that buyer i gets an item under this type
profile, i.e., the probability that (i, j) ∈ A(b, s) for some j. Similarly, for every j ∈ [m], we use xSj (b, s) to
denote the probability that seller j sells her item. Given a mechanism (xB, xS , pB, pS), for every type profile
(b, s), buyer i’s utility is bi · xBi (b, s)− pBi (b, s) and similarly seller j’s utility is pSj (b, s)− sj · xSj (b, s).
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We again slightly abuse notation to let xBi (bi) = Eb−i,s[xBi (bi, b−i, s)] be the interim probability that
buyer i gets an item when she reports type bi, over the randomness of mechanism and other agents’ types.
Similarly, let xSj (sj) be seller j’s interim probability to sell her item when she reports type sj .
An allocation rule x = (xB, xS) is monotone if for every buyer i ∈ [n], xBi (bi, b−i, s) is non-decreasing
in bi for any fixed b−i and s, and for every seller j ∈ [m], xSj (b, sj , s−j) is non-increasing in sj for any
fixed b and s−j .
An allocation rule x = (xB, xS) is implementable if for every s and b, the allocation can be expressed
as a distribution over matchings in F . The set of all implementable allocation rule is closed and convex,
which depends on the feasibility constraint F . We denote such set as P (F).
Budget Balance Constraints
There are a few variants of the budget balance constraints.
• Strong Budget Balance (SBB): Under any type profile, the sum of all buyers’ (expected) payment is
equal to the sum of all sellers’ (expected) gains, over the randomness of mechanism.
• Weak Budget Balance (WBB): Under any type profile, the sum of all buyers’ (expected) payment is
at least the sum of all sellers’ (expected) gains, over the randomness of mechanism.
• Ex-ante Strong Budget Balance (Ex-ante SBB): The sum of all buyers’ expected payment is equal
to the sum of all sellers’ expected gains, over the randomness of mechanism and the type profile of all
agents.
• Ex-ante Weak Budget Balance (Ex-ante WBB): The sum of all buyers’ expected payment is at least
the sum of all sellers’ expected gains, over the randomness of mechanism and the type profile of all
agents.
We discuss the connections between these variants in Section 6.
Gains from Trade
Gains from Trade(GFT) is the objective function we study. It describes the gains of social welfare
induced by the mechanism. In other words, GFT is the social welfare of the allocation selected by the
mechanism minus the sum of sellers’ value. Formally, given a mechanism M = (A, pB, pS), the expected
GFT for the mechanism is defined as
GFT(M) =
∑
b∈TB
∑
s∈TS
fB(b)fS(s) ·
∑
(i,j)∈A(b,s)
(bi − sj) (1)
or using the definition of xB, xS ,
GFT(M) =
∑
b∈TB
∑
s∈TS
fB(b)fS(s) ·
 n∑
i=1
xBi (b, s) · bi −
m∑
j=1
xSj (b, s) · sj
 (2)
We use OPT to denote the highest expected GFT obtainable by any IR, BIC, ex-ante WBB mechanism.
Continuous vs. Discrete Distributions
We explicitly assume that the input distributions are discrete. Nevertheless, if the distributions are
continuous, we can write a continuous LP and derive the duality based upper bound similarly. All the rest
of the analysis holds for continuous distributions without much modification. So our results also apply to
continuous distributions.
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3 Duality
In this section, we apply the Cai-Devanur-Weinberg duality framework to obtain a benchmark for the optimal
GFT obtainable by any IR, BIC and ex-ante WBB mechanism. The same formulation can easily be extended
to the general two-sided markets. The main theorem for this section is shown as follows:
Theorem 1. Given a double auction, let OPT be the optimal GFT among all IR, BIC and ex-ante WBB
mechanisms, for any α ≥ 0,
OPT ≤ max
x∈P (F)
∑
b,s
fB(b)fS(s)
 n∑
i=1
xBi (b, s) · (bi + α · ϕ˜i(bi))−
m∑
j=1
xSj (b, s) · (sj + α · τ˜j(sj))
 .
ϕ˜i(·) is Myerson’s ironed virtual value function for buyer i. τ˜j(·) is symmetric to ϕ˜i(·), and we will refer
to it as the Myerson’s ironed virtual value function for seller j. See Appendix A for more details.
First, let us state an interesting equivalence among the ex-ante WBB constraint and the SBB constraint
for IR and BIC mechanisms. A SBB mechanism is clearly ex-ante WBB, and we demonstrate the other
direction in Theorem 2. The intuition behind Theorem 2 is that if our mechanism has positive surplus, we
can simply divide the surplus to the agents evenly and independently from their reported types (Lemma 11).
Now we have an ex-ante SBB mechanism. Next, we massage the payments so that all interim payments
remain unchanged, while under every type profile the sum of buyers’ payments equal the sum of sellers’
gains. This is achieved via an interesting linear transformation on the payments (Theorem 6).
Theorem 2. Given an IR, BIC, ex-ante WBB mechanism M = (xB, xS , pB, pS) with non-negative payment
rule, there exists another non-negative payment rule (pB
′
, pS
′
) such that the mechanismM ′ = (xB, xS , pB′ , pS′)
is IR, BIC and SBB.
Proof. It follows from Lemma 11 and Theorem 6. See Section 6 for more details.
3.1 Duality Framework
We aim to find an IR, BIC, ex-ante WBB mechanism that maximizes the GFT in a double auction. Due
to Theorem 2, this is equivalent to finding an IR, BIC, SBB mechanism that maximizes the GFT, which is
captured by the following LP (Figure 1). To ease notation, we use a special type∅ to represent the choice of
not participating in the mechanism. More specifically, xBi (∅, b−i, s) = pBi (∅, b−i, s) = 0 for any b−i and
s. Now the interim IR constraint can be described as another BIC constraint: for any type bi, buyer i does
not want to report type ∅. Let TB+i = TBi ∪ {∅}. Similarly, we define the same type for every seller j and
let TS+j = T
S
j ∪ {∅}.
We take the partial Lagrangian dual of the LP in Figure 1 by lagrangifying the BIC constraints for all
agents. Let λBi (bi, b
′
i) be the Lagrange multiplier associated with buyer i’s BIC constraints, and λ
S
j (sj , s
′
j)
be the Lagrange multiplier associated with seller j’s BIC constraints (see Figure 2).
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Variables:
• pBi (b, s), pSj (b, s), for all buyers i ∈ [n], sellers j ∈ [m], and value profile b ∈ TB, s ∈ TS denoting
buyer i’s payment and seller j’s gains accordingly, under type profile (b, s).
• xBi (b, s), xSj (b, s), for all buyers i ∈ [n], sellers j ∈ [m], and value profile b ∈ TB, s ∈ TS denoting
the probability that buyer i gets an item and seller j sells her item accordingly, under type profile
(b, s).
Constraints:
• Eb−i,s
[(
bi · xBi (bi, b−i, s)− pBi (bi, b−i, s)
)− (b′i · xBi (b′i, b−i, s)− pBi (b′i, b−i, s))] ≥ 0, for all
buyer i, and types bi ∈ TBi , b′i ∈ TB+i , guaranteeing that the mechanism is BIC and IR for all
buyers.
• Eb,s−j
[(
pSj (b, sj , s−j)− sj · xSj (b, sj , s−j)
)
−
(
pSj (b, s
′
j , s−j)− s′j · xSj (b, s′j , s−j)
)]
≥ 0, for
all seller j, and types sj ∈ TSj , s′j ∈ TS+j , guaranteeing that the mechanism is BIC and IR for all
sellers.
• ∑ni=1 pBi (b, s) = ∑mj=1 pSj (b, s) for every b ∈ TB, s ∈ TS , guaranteeing that the mechanism is
SBB.
• x ∈ P (F), guaranteeing x = (xB, xS) is implementable.
Objective:
• maxEb,s
[∑n
i=1 x
B
i (b, s) · bi −
∑m
j=1 x
S
j (b, s) · sj
]
, the expected Gains from Trade.
Figure 1: A Linear Program (LP) for Maximizing Gains from Trade.
Here L(λ, x, p) is the partial Lagrangian that is defined as:
L(λ, x, p)
= Eb,s
 n∑
i=1
xBi (b, s) · bi −
m∑
j=1
xSj (b, s) · sj

+
∑
i
∑
bi,b′i
λBi (bi, b
′
i) · Eb−i,s
[(
bi · xBi (bi, b−i, s)− pBi (bi, b−i, s)
)− (b′i · xBi (b′i, b−i, s)− pBi (b′i, b−i, s))]
+
∑
j
∑
sj ,s′j
λSj (sj , s
′
j) · Eb,s−j
[(
pSj (b, sj , s−j)− sj · xSj (b, sj , s−j)
)− (pSj (b, s′j , s−j)− s′j · xSj (b, s′j , s−j))]
(3)
Similar to the framework in [4], we show that the dual variables need to have certain nice format in order
for the partial Lagrangian to be finite. Notice that the argument here is different from the one in one-sided
markets, as the payments are no longer unconstrained and have to satisfy the SBB constraint. We call a
payment rule p = (pB, pS) balanced if it satisfies the SBB constraint.
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Variables:
• λBi (bi, b′i) for all i, bi ∈ TBi , b′i ∈ TB+i , the Lagrangian multiplier for buyers’ BIC and IR constraints.
• λSj (sj , s′j) for all j, sj ∈ TSj , s′j ∈ TS+j , the Lagrangian multiplier for sellers’ BIC and IR constraints.
• pBi (b, s), pSj (b, s), xBi (b, s), xSj (b, s) for all i, j,b ∈ TB, s ∈ TS .
Constraints:
• λBi (bi, b′i) ≥ 0 for all i, bi ∈ TBi , b′i ∈ TB+i .
• λSj (sj , s′j) ≥ 0 for all j, sj ∈ TSj , s′j ∈ TS+j .
• ∑ni=1 pBi (b, s) = ∑mj=1 pSj (b, s) for every b ∈ TB, s ∈ TS .
• x ∈ P (F).
Objective:
• minλ maxx,p L(λ, x, p).
Figure 2: Partial Lagrangian of the LP for Maximizing Gains from Trade.
L(λ, x, p) =
∑
i
∑
bi∈TBi
( ∑
b′i∈TB+i
λBi (bi, b
′
i)−
∑
b′i∈TBi
λBi (b
′
i, bi)
)
· Eb−i,s
[
pBi (bi, b−i, s)
]
+
∑
j
∑
sj∈TSj
( ∑
s′j∈TSj
λSj (s
′
j , sj)−
∑
s′j∈TS+j
λSj (sj , s
′
j)
)
· Eb,s−j
[
pSj (b, sj , s−j)
]
+
∑
b
∑
s
fB(b)fS(s) ·
 n∑
i=1
xBi (b, s) · bi −
m∑
j=1
xSj (b, s) · sj

+
∑
i
∑
bi,b′i
λBi (bi, b
′
i) · Eb−i,s
[(
bi · xBi (bi, b−i, s)
)− (b′i · xBi (b′i, b−i, s))]
+
∑
j
∑
sj ,s′j
λSj (sj , s
′
j) · Eb,s−j
[(
s′j · xSj (b, s′j , s−j)
)− (sj · xSj (b, sj , s−j))]
(4)
Definition 1 (Useful Dual Variables [4]). A set of feasible duals λ is useful if
max
x∈P (F), p balanced
L(λ, x, p) <∞.
Lemma 1. A set of dual variables is useful iff there exists a nonnegative number α such that for every i, j
and every bi ∈ TBi , sj ∈ TSj ,
1
fBi (bi)
(
∑
b′i∈TB+i
λBi (bi, b
′
i)−
∑
b′i∈TBi
λBi (b
′
i, bi)) =
1
fSj (sj)
(
∑
s′j∈TS+j
λSj (sj , s
′
j)−
∑
s′j∈TSj
λSj (s
′
j , sj)) = α (5)
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Equivalently, it means for each buyer i (or seller j), λBi (or λ
S
j ) forms a valid flow on the following
graph. We use buyer λBi as an example to illustrate this flow:
• Nodes: A super source S, a super sink ∅, and a node bi for every type bi ∈ TBi .
• An edge from S to bi of weight α · fBi (bi), for all bi ∈ TBi .
• An edge from bi to b′i of weight λBi (bi, b′i) for all bi ∈ TBi , and b′i ∈ TB+i (including the sink).
Equation (5) guarantees that we have flow conservation on every node of this graph.
Proof. For every i ∈ [n], j ∈ [m] denote
Ai(bi) =
1
fBi (bi)
 ∑
b′i∈TB+i
λBi (bi, b
′
i)−
∑
b′i∈TBi
λBi (b
′
i, bi)

Bj(sj) =
1
fSj (sj)
 ∑
s′j∈TS+j
λSj (sj , s
′
j)−
∑
s′j∈TSj
λSj (s
′
j , sj)

If there exists i, j, bi, sj such that Ai(bi) 6= Bj(sj). WLOG, assume Ai(bi) > Bj(sj). We choose some
arbitrary b−i, s−j and increase pBi (b, s) and p
S
j (b, s) simultaneously by ζ, while keeping the payment for
other type profiles unchanged. The payment rule stays balanced and with Equation (4), L(λ, x, p) will
change by
∆L(λ, x, p) = ζ · fBi (bi)Ai(bi) · fB−i(b−i)fS(s)− ζ · fSj (sj)Bj(sj) · fB(b)fS−j(s−j)
= ζ · fB(b)fS(s)(Ai(bi)−Bj(sj)) > 0
If we let ζ → ∞, clearly the payment rule is still balanced, but L(λ, x, p) goes to infinity. Hence, λ is not
useful. Thus for every i, j and bi, sj , Ai(bi) = Bj(sj). There exists an α such that Equation (5) holds.
Moreover, we can view Equation (5) as the flow conservation condition for bi (or sj), therefore λBi (or λ
S
j )
must form a flow.
Next, we argue that α must be nonnegative. Note that
∑
bi∈TBi
λBi (bi, ∅) =
∑
bi∈TBi
 ∑
b′i∈TB+i
λB(bi, b
′
i)−
∑
b′i∈TBi
λB(b′i, bi)
 = α · ∑
bi∈TBi
fBi (bi).
Since λBi (∅, bi) is nonnegative for all type bi, α must also be nonnegative.
For the other direction, if Ai(bi) = Bj(sj) for any i, j, bi, sj , L(λ, x, p) only depends on x. Since x is
bounded, the maximum of the partial Lagrangian is finite.
According to Lemma 1, for useful dual variables, we replace
∑
b′i∈TB+i λ
B
i (bi, b
′
i) with
∑
b′i∈TBi λ
B
i (b
′
i, bi)+
α · fBi (bi) and
∑
s′j∈TS+j λ
S
j (sj , s
′
j) with
∑
s′j∈TSj λ
S
j (s
′
j , sj) + α · fSj (sj) for every i, j in the partial La-
grangian L(λ, x, p). After simplification, we have
L(λ, x, p) =
∑
b,s
fB(b)fS(s)
 n∑
i=1
xBi (b, s) · ΦBi (bi)−
m∑
j=1
xSj (b, s) · ΦSj (sj)
 (6)
where ΦBi (bi) and Φ
S
j (sj) are defined in Definition 2.
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Definition 2 (Virtual Value Function). For any λ that satisfies Equation (5) for all buyer i and her type bi
and seller j and her type sj , we define a corresponding virtual value function ΦBi (·), such that for every
type bi ∈ TBi ,
ΦBi (bi) = (α+ 1) · bi −
1
fBi (bi)
∑
b′i∈TBi
λBi (b
′
i, bi) · (b′i − bi)
Similarly for every seller j, define ΦSj (·) such that for every type sj ∈ TSj ,
ΦSj (sj) = (α+ 1) · sj −
1
fSj (sj)
∑
s′j∈TSj
λSj (s
′
j , sj) · (s′j − sj)
3.2 The Canonical Flow
In this section we describe a flow and using which we derive an upper bound for the GFT. For buyers and
sellers, we use different flows. For every i, λBi (b
′
i, bi) > 0 if and only if b
′
i is the predecessor type of bi, i.e.,
the smallest value in the support set TBi that is greater than bi. For every j, λ
S
j (s
′
j , sj) > 0 if and only if s
′
j
is the successor type of sj , i.e., the largest value in the support set TSj that is smaller than sj . In other words,
for buyer, the flow goes from higher types to lower types while for the seller, the flow goes from lower types
to higher ones. Our flow λ has the following property.
Lemma 2. For any α ≥ 0, there exists a set of dual variables such that:
• for every buyer i and every type bi,
ΦBi (bi) = bi + α ·
(
bi −
∑
t>bi
fBi (t) · (bˆi − bi)
fBi (bi)
)
,
where bˆi is the predecessor type of bi;
• for every seller j and every type sj ,
ΦSj (sj) = sj + α ·
(
sj −
∑
t<sj
fSj (t) · (sˆj − sj)
fSj (sj)
)
,
where sˆj is the successor type of sj .
Let ϕi(bi) := bi−
∑
t>bi
fBi (t)·(bˆi−bi)
fBi (bi)
and τj(sj) := sj−
∑
t<sj
fSj (t)·(sˆj−sj)
fSj (sj)
. ϕi(·) is Myerson’s virtual value
function for buyer i. As τj(·) is symmetric to ϕi(·), we will refer to it as the Myerson’s virtual value function
for seller j. Furthermore, if ϕi(·) (or τj(·)) is monotonically non-decreasing, we say DBi (or DSj ) is regular.
Proof. For each buyer i and her type bi, bi only gets flow from bˆi, which is originally the flow from source
to a type b′i > bi. The total amount of flow goes into bi is α ·
∑
b′i>bi
fBi (b
′
i). By Definition 2,
ΦBi (bi) = (α+ 1) · bi −
α ·∑b′i>bi fBi (b′i) · (bˆi − bi)
fBi (bi)
= bi + α · ϕi(bi)
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Similarly, for each seller j and her type sj , sj only gets flow from sˆj , and total amount of flow is α ·∑
s′j<sj
fSj (s
′
j).
ΦSj (sj) = (α+ 1) · sj −
α ·∑s′j<sj fSj (s′j) · (sˆj − sj)
fSj (sj)
= sj + α · τj(sj)
When the distributions are irregular, we can iron the virtual value function with the method shown in [4]
by adding loops to the flow. See Appendix A for more details about the ironing process and the proof of
Lemma 3.
Lemma 3. For any α ≥ 0, there exists a set of dual variables λ such that
ΦBi (bi) = bi + α · ϕ˜i(bi)
ΦSj (sj) = sj + α · τ˜j(sj)
Now we are ready to prove our main theorem of this section.
Proof of Theorem 1: It follows directly from Equation (6) and Lemma 3. 2
4 Single Buyer, Single Seller Bilateral Trading
To warm up, we first study the classical bilateral trading setting, when there is only one buyer and one seller.
In this section, we show two simple IR, BIC, SBB mechanisms and prove that the better one obtains at least
half of the optimal GFT.
1. Seller-Offering Mechanism(SOM): The seller posts a take-it or leave-it price qB(s) for the item to
the buyer. The item price depends on her true type s and the buyer’s value distribution. The buyer has
to pay qB(s) to the seller if she chooses to take the item.
2. Buyer-Offering Mechanism(BOM): The buyer posts a take-it or leave-it price qS(b) for the item to
the seller. The item price depends on her true type b and the seller’s value distribution. The seller can
get qS(b) from the buyer if she chooses to sell the item.
Both mechanisms are clearly IR and SBB. For SOM, the seller has the information of her true type s
and the buyer’s type distribution DB . She will choose qB(s) to maximize her expected utility and thus the
mechanism is BIC for the seller. Then the buyer sees the posted price and will buy if and only if her value b
is greater than qB(s), no matter what s is. Hence the mechanism is DSIC for the buyer. Similarly, BOM is
BIC for the buyer and DSIC for the seller. Let GFTSOM and GFTBOM be the expected GFT for SOM and
BOM. In the following Lemma, we characterize the value of GFTSOM and GFTBOM.
Lemma 4.
GFTSOM = Eb,s[(b− s) · 1[ϕ˜(b) > s]]
GFTBOM = Eb,s[(b− s) · 1[b > τ˜(s)]]
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Proof. If the seller uses q as the posted price in the SOM, the seller’s expected utility is (q−s) ·Prb∼DB [b ≥
q]5. And qS(s) = argmaxq ((q − s) · Prb∼DB [b ≥ q]). Let TB = {β1, ..., βK} where β1 < β2 < ... < βK .
Clearly the optimal item price qB(s) must take one of the values from support set TB , i.e., qS(s) = βk
where k maximizes (βk − s) ·
∑K
r=k f
B(βr). The following Lemma characterizes the seller’s gains, in
function of the buyer’s ironed virtual value. The proof is postponed to the Appendix B.
Lemma 5. Let TB = {β1, ..., βK} where β1 < β2 < ... < βK . For any k ∈ [K],
K∑
r=k
ϕ˜(βr) · fB(βr) ≥ βk ·
K∑
r=k
fB(βr).
The equality holds if type βk is not in the interior of any ironed interval.
According to Lemma 5, (βk − s) ·
∑K
r=k f
B(βr) ≤
∑K
r=k(ϕ˜(βr) − s) · fB(βr) for all k ∈ [K].
Moreover, equality holds for the optimal k. That is, to maximize
∑K
r=k(ϕ˜(βr)− s) · fB(βr), since ϕ˜(βr) is
non-decreasing in r, the optimal k∗ is the smallest k such that ϕ˜(βk) > s. Clearly, βk∗ is not in the interior
of any ironed interval because ϕ˜(βk∗−1) ≤ s < ϕ˜(βk∗).Thus, (βk∗ − s) ·
∑K
r=k f
B(βr) =
∑K
r=k∗(ϕ˜(βr)−
s) ·fB(βr) and the seller should post βk∗ as the price. In SOM, the trade will be made if and only if b ≥ βk∗ ,
which is equivalent to ϕ˜(b) > s. Hence, GFTSOM = Eb,s[(b− s) · 1[ϕ˜(b) > s]].
Similarly, if the buyer chooses q as the posted price in BOM, the buyer’s expected utility is (b − q) ·
Prs∼DS [s ≤ q]. Let TS = {α1, ..., αK′} where α1 < α2 < ... < αK′ . The optimal item price qS(b) must
take one value from support set TS , i.e., qB(b) = αk where k maximizes (b − αk) ·
∑k
r=1 f
S(αr). The
following Lemma characterizes the buyer’s cost, in function of the seller’s ironed virtual value. The proof is
postponed to the Appendix B.
Lemma 6. Let TS = {α1, ..., αK′} where α1 < α2 < ... < αK′ . For any k ∈ [K ′],
k∑
r=1
τ˜(αr) · fS(αr) ≤ αk ·
k∑
r=1
fS(αr)
The equality holds if type αk is not in the interior of an ironed interval.
We use an argument similar to the one for SOM. From Lemma 6 we know that (b−αk)·
∑k
r=1 f
S(αr) ≤∑k
r=1(b− τ˜(αr)) · fS(αr). Since τ˜(αr) is non-decreasing on r, the optimal k† that maximizes
∑k
r=1(b−
τ˜(αr)) · fS(αr) is the largest k such that τ˜(αk) < b. For the same reason, αk† cannot lie in the interior of
any ironed interval, hence equality holds and the best posted price for the buyer is αk† . In BOM, the trade
will be made if and only if s ≤ αk† , which is equivalent to b > τ˜(s). Hence, GFTBOM = Eb,s[(b−s) ·1[b >
τ˜(s)]].
With Lemma 4, we are ready to show that the better of SOM and BOM has GFT at least 12 OPT.
Theorem 3.
GFTSOM + GFTBOM ≥ OPT
5We assume here the buyer will buy the item with zero utility. It makes no difference from buying the item with strict positive
utility since the seller can decrease the posted price for an arbitrarily small constant and the seller’s utility will be changed as small
as possible.
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Proof. By Theorem 1,
OPT ≤ max
x∈P (F)
∑
b
∑
s
fB(b)fS(s)
(
xB(b, s) · (b+ ϕ˜(b))− xS(b, s) · (s+ τ˜(s)))
Notice that xB(b, s) = xS(b, s) for all b, s, the maximum value is achieved when xB(b, s) = 1 if
b+ ϕ˜(b)− s− τ˜(s) > 0 and xB(b, s) = 0 otherwise. In other words,
OPT ≤
∑
b
∑
s
fB(b)fS(s) · (b+ ϕ˜(b)− s− τ˜(s)) · 1[b+ ϕ˜(b)− s− τ˜(s) > 0] (7)
We further relax the RHS of Inequality (7),
OPT ≤ Eb,s [((ϕ˜(b)− s) + (b− τ˜(s))) · 1[b+ ϕ˜(b)− s− τ˜(s) > 0]]
≤ Eb,s [(ϕ˜(b)− s) · 1[ϕ˜(b)− s > 0]] + Eb,s [(b− τ˜(s)) · 1[b− τ˜(s) > 0]]
(8)
Notice that for any s, let k be the smallest value such that ϕ˜(βk)− s > 0.
Eb[(ϕ˜(b)− s) · 1[ϕ˜(b)− s > 0]] =
K∑
r=k
ϕ˜(βr) · fB(βr)− s · Pr
b
[ϕ˜(b)− s > 0]
= βk ·
K∑
r=k
fB(βr)− s · Pr
b
[ϕ˜(b)− s > 0]
≤
K∑
r=k
βr · fB(βr)− s · Pr
b
[ϕ˜(b)− s > 0]
= Eb[(b− s) · 1[ϕ˜(b)− s > 0]]
(9)
where the second equation is because βk must not lie in the interior of any ironed interval, so Lemma 5
implies that the two quantities are equal. If we take expectation over s, Eb,s [(ϕ˜(b)− s) · 1[ϕ˜(b)− s > 0]] ≤
GFTSOM according to Lemma 4. Similarly, we have Eb,s [(b− τ˜(s)) · 1[b− τ˜(s) > 0]] ≤ GFTBOM. Our
claim follows from combining these two inequalities with Inequality (8).
5 Double Auctions
In Section 4, we proposed two simple mechanisms approximating the optimal GFT for the bilateral trading
setting. Both of the mechanisms are IR, BIC and SBB. However in double auctions, such a mechanism
appears to be hard to design directly. One significant barrier is to find a payment rule that simultaneously
satisfies all three conditions mentioned above. Indeed, given an allocation rule, even monotone, such a pay-
ment rule is not guaranteed to exist. Myerson and Satterthwaite [22] characterized the monotone allocation
rules for which such payment rules exist in the bilateral trading setting. They also provided an explicit de-
scription of the payment. In Section 7, we provide a similar characterization for the double auction setting
(see Theorem 7). However, even knowing there exists a payment rule that makes the mechanism IR, BIC
and SBB, it is still not easy to explicitly describe these payments.
We circumvent this difficulty by first considering a weaker BB constraint – ex-ante WBB, then apply
Theorem 2 to transform the designed mechanism into an SBB one. In this section, we propose a simple, IR,
DSIC and ex-ante WBB mechanism whose GFT is at least OPT2 .
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Theorem 4. In any double auction, there exists an IR, DSIC and ex-ante WBB mechanism whose GFT is at
least OPT2 .
Again, we propose two mechanisms and show that the better one has GFT at least 12 OPT. The allocation
and payment rule are defined as follows:
Definition 3. We consider the following two mechanisms which are the generalizations of SOM and BOM
in double auctions.
• Generalized Seller-Offering Mechanism (GSOM): Given type profile b, s, find a matchingA(b, s) ∈
F that maximizes∑(i,j)∈A(b,s)(ϕ˜i(bi)− sj). We use A1(b, s) to denote the maximum weight match-
ing. For each (i, j) ∈ A1(b, s), buyer i trades with seller j. According to Lemma 7, this allocation
rule is monotone, and the buyer (or the seller) pays (or receives) the threshold payment. See below
for more details about the payment rule.
• Generalized Buyer-OfferingMechanism (GBOM): Given type profile b, s, find a matchingA(b, s) ∈
F that maximizes∑(i,j)∈A(b,s)(bi − τ˜j(sj)). We use A2(b, s) to denote the maximum weight match-
ing. For each (i, j) ∈ A2(b, s), buyer i trades with seller j. According to Lemma 7, this allocation
rule is monotone, and the buyer (or the seller) pays (or receives) the threshold payment.
Given type profile (b, s), both mechanisms first build a complete bipartite graph between the buyers and
the sellers with edge weight wij(bi, sj) equal to ϕ˜i(bi) − sj (or bi − τ˜j(sj)) for the edge between buyer i
and seller j. Then a maximum weight matching A(b, s) within the family F is chosen.
Lemma 7. Suppose wij(bi, sj) is non-decreasing in bi and non-increasing in sj for every buyer i and seller
j. For any type profile b, s, if edge (i, j) is in the maximum weight matchingM, this edge is in the maximum
weight matching under type profile (b′i, b−i, s) (or (b, s
′
j , s−j)) for any b
′
i > bi (or any s
′
j < sj).
Proof. We prove that for any b′i > bi,M is still a maximum weight matching under type profile (b′i, b−i, s).
For convenience, we usewij(b, s) to represent the weight of edge (i, j) under type profile (b, s). wij(b, s) =
wij(bi, sj). For every matching M′ ∈ F , notice that wi′j′(b, s) = wi′j′(b′i, b−i, s) for all i′ 6= i and all
j′ ∈ [m]. Hence,∑
(i′,j′)∈M
wi′j′(b
′
i, b−i, s) =
∑
(i′,j′)∈M
wi′j′(b, s) +
(
wij(b
′
i, sj)− wij(bi, sj)
)
≥
∑
(i′,j′)∈M′
wi′j′(b, s) + (wij(b
′
i, sj)− wij(bi, sj)) (Optimality ofM)
≥
∑
(i′,j′)∈M′
wi′j′(b
′
i, b−i, s)
(10)
The last inequality is an equality if (i, j) ∈ M′. If (i, j) /∈ M′, the inequality is because wij(b′i, sj) −
wij(bi, sj) ≥ 0 and
∑
(i′,j′)∈M′ wi′,j′(b, s) =
∑
(i′,j′)∈M′ wi′j′(b
′
i, b−i, s). Thus,M is a maximum weight
matching under type profile (b′i, b−i, s). Similarly, we can show that M is a maximum weight matching
under type profile (b, sj , sj′) for all s′j < sj .
By Lemma 7, the allocation rules for GSOM and GBOM are both monotone due to the monotonicity of
functions ϕ˜i(·) and τ˜j(·) for all i, j. We use the threshold payment, that is, given any type profile b, s, for
every buyer i, if xBi (b, s) = 0, p
B
i (b, s) is also 0, and if x
B
i (b, s) = 1, p
B
i (b, s) equals the smallest b
′
i such
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that xBi (b
′
i, b−i, s) = 1. Similarly, for every seller j, if x
S
j (b, s) = 0, p
S
j (b, s) is also 0, and if x
S
j (b, s) = 1,
pSj (b, s) equals to the largest s
′
j such that x
S
j (b, s
′
j , s−j) = 1. As the allocation rule is monotone and we
use threshold payments, the mechanism is IR and DSIC for every agent.
5.1 GSOM and GBOM in Bilateral Trading
As a warmup, we show that the GSOM (or the GBOM) is ex-ante WBB in the bilateral trading setting. Let
TB = {β1, ..., βK} where β1 < β2 < ... < βK and TS = {α1, ..., αK′} where α1 < α2 < ... < αK′ . For
GSOM, the pair is selected in the optimal matching if and only if the weight ϕ˜(b)− s > 0. Notice that this
is exactly the allocation rule used in SOM.
Lemma 8. In the Bilateral Trading setting, GSOM is an IR, DSIC and ex-ante WBB mechanism.
Proof. We only need to prove that GSOM is ex-ante WBB. By definition of the mechanism, if xB(b, s) =
xS(b, s) = 1, pB(b, s) = βk(s) where k(s) is the smallest index such that ϕ˜
(
βk(s)
) ≥ s, which depends on
s. On the other hand, pS(b, s) = αc(b) where c(b) is the largest index such that αc(b) ≤ ϕ˜(b), which depends
on b.
For every s,
Eb
[
pB(b, s)
]
= βk(s) ·
K∑
r=k(s)
fB(βr),
and
Eb
[
pS(b, s)
]
=
K∑
r=k(s)
αc(βr) · fB(βr) ≤
K∑
r=k(s)
ϕ˜(βr) · fB(βr).
By definition of k(s), it is easy to see that k(s) is not in the interior of any ironed interval, so βk(s) ·∑K
r=k(s) f
B(βr) =
∑K
r=k(s) ϕ˜(βr) · fB(βr) by Lemma 5. Therefore, Eb
[
pS(b, s)
] ≤ Eb [pB(b, s)].
Taking expectation over s on both sides finishes the proof.
Similarly, we can prove that GBOM is ex-ante WBB. The trade happens if and only if the weight
b − τ˜(s) > 0 in GBOM, which is exactly the same allocation rule with BOM. Using a similar argument as
in Lemma 8, we can prove the following Lemma.
Lemma 9. In the Bilateral Trading setting, GBOM is an IR, DSIC and ex-ante WBB mechanism.
5.2 The General Case
In this section, we consider the general double auction setting, and we first argue that both GSOM and
GBOM are ex-ante WBB. The idea is to consider each pair (i, j) separately and show that the expected
payment of buyer i for trading with seller j is greater than the expected gains of seller j for trading with
buyer i. The formal proof uses similar techniques as in Lemma 8.
Lemma 10. Both GSOM and GBOM are IR, DSIC and ex-ante WBB mechanisms.
Proof. We will give the proof for GSOM and the same argument applies to GBOM. Let (xB, xS , pB, pS)
be the allocation and payment rule for GSOM. For every i, j and type profile b, s, let xij(b, s) = 1[(i, j) ∈
A1(b, s)] representing whether buyer i is trading with seller j. Clearly xBi (b, s) =
∑
j∈[m] xij(b, s),
xSj (b, s) =
∑
i∈[n] xij(b, s). We notice that with threshold payments, p
B
i (b, s) (or p
S
j (b, s)) is non-zero
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only if xBi (b, s) (or x
S
j (b, s)) is 1. Then the difference between all buyers’ expected payments and sellers’
expected gains can be written as
Eb,s
[ n∑
i=1
xBi (b, s)p
B
i (b, s)−
m∑
j=1
xSj (b, s)p
S
j (b, s)
]
=Eb,s
[ ∑
(i,j)∈A1(b,s)
xij(b, s) ·
(
pBi (b, s)− pSj (b, s)
) ]
=Eb,s
[∑
i,j
xij(b, s) ·
(
pBi (b, s)− pSj (b, s)
) ]
=
n∑
i=1
m∑
j=1
Eb,s
[
xij(b, s) ·
(
pBi (b, s)− pSj (b, s)
)]
(11)
Now we fix i, j, b−i and s−j . Lemma 7 states that if a pair (i, j) is in the max weight matching then
increasing the value of bi or decreasing the value of sj will not remove this pair from the max weight
matching. In other words, xij(bi, b−i, sj , s−j) is non-decreasing in bi and non-increasing in sj . Next, we
characterize the threshold payments of i and j. Again, let TBi = {β1, ..., βK} where β1 < β2 < ... < βK
and TSj = {α1, ..., αK′} where α1 < α2 < ... < αK′ . For every bi ∈ TBi , define c(bi) to be the largest
index c such that xij(bi, b−i, αc, s−j) = 1. Notice that when (i, j) ∈ A1(bi, b−i, αc, s−j), ϕ˜i(bi)− αc must
be non-negative, as the feasibility constraintF is downward-closed, so removing a pair with negative weight
gives a strictly better matching. Thus, αc(bi) ≤ ϕ˜i(bi).
Similarly, for every sj ∈ TSj , define k(sj) to be the smallest index k such that xij(βk, b−i, sj , s−j) = 1.
By the definition of threshold payments, given bi, sj , if xij(b, s) = 1, pSj (b, s) = αc(bi). As for the buyer,
pBi (b, s) = βk(sj). The reason is that when sj ≥ αc(bi) (or bi ≤ βk(sj)) then xSj (b, s) (or xBi (b, s)) must be
0. Imagine this is not the case, and j (or i) is in the maximum matching with some other buyer i′ (or seller
j′) under profile (b, s), then clearly if we decrease the value of sj (or increase the value of bi), (i′, j) (or
(i, j′)) should remain in the maximum matching according to Lemma 7. Contradiction.
Now fix sj , xij(b, s) = 1 if and only if bi ≥ βk(sj) by the definition of k(sj). we have
Ebi
[
xij(b, s)p
B
i (b, s)
]
= βk(sj) ·
K∑
k=k(sj)
fBi (βk) (12)
Ebi
[
xij(b, s)p
S
i (b, s)
]
=
K∑
k=k(sj)
fBi (βk) · αc(βk) ≤
K∑
k=k(sj)
fBi (βk) · ϕ˜i(βk) (13)
Notice again that βk(sj) does not lie in the interior of any ironed interval for all sj . So βk(sj)·∑K
k=k(sj)
fBi (βk) =
∑K
k=k(sj)
fBi (βk) · ϕ˜i(βk) by Lemma 5. Hence,
Ebi
[
xij(b, s)p
B
i (b, s)
] ≥ Ebi [xij(b, s)pSi (b, s)] .
Take expectation over sj , b−i, s−j , and sum over all i, j:
n∑
i=1
m∑
j=1
Eb,s
[
xij(b, s)(p
B
i (b, s)− pSj (b, s))
] ≥ 0 (14)
Hence, GSOM is ex-ante WBB.
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Now we are ready to prove Theorem 4.
Proof of Theorem 4: We use GFTGSOM (or GFTGBOM) to denote the expected GFT of GSOM (or GBOM).
According to Lemma 10, both GSOM and GBOM are IR, BIC and ex-ante WBB, so we only need to prove
that GFTGSOM + GFTGBOM ≥ OPT. By Equation 6 and Lemma 3, when α = 1, for any IR, BIC and SBB
mechanism M = (A, xB, xS , pB, pS),
GFT(M) ≤ Eb,s
 n∑
i=1
xBi (b, s) · (bi + ϕ˜i(bi))−
m∑
j=1
xSj (b, s) · (sj + τ˜j(sj))

= Eb,s
 ∑
(i,j)∈A(b,s)
(bi + ϕ˜i(bi)− sj − τ˜j(sj))
 (Definition of A(b, s))
≤ Eb,s
 ∑
(i,j)∈A1(b,s)
(ϕ˜i(bi)− sj)
+ Eb,s
 ∑
(i,j)∈A2(b,s)
(bi − τ˜j(sj))
 (Definition 3)
(15)
For every i, j, fix b−i, s, we continue to use the notation k(sj) and xij(b, s) as in Lemma 10 according
to GSOM.
Ebi [(ϕ˜(bi)− sj) · xij(b, s)]
=
K∑
r=k(sj)
ϕ˜(βr) · fB(βr)− sj · Ebi [xij(b, s)]
=βk(sj) ·
K∑
r=k(sj)
fB(βr)− sj ·
K∑
r=k(sj)
fB(βr) (βk(sj) not in interior of any ironed interval)
≤
K∑
r=k(sj)
(βr − sj) · fB(βr)
=Ebi [(bi − sj) · xij(b, s)]
(16)
Take expectation on b−i, s, and then sum up over all i, j:
Eb,s
 ∑
(i,j)∈A1(b,s)
(ϕ˜i(bi)− sj)
 = ∑
i,j
Eb,s [(ϕ˜(bi)− sj) · xij(b, s)]
≤
∑
i,j
Eb,s [(bi − sj) · xij(b, s)] = GFTGSOM
(17)
Similarly, we have Eb,s
[∑
(i,j)∈A2(b,s) (bi − τ˜j(sj))
]
≤ GFTGBOM. Combine this with Inequality (15),
we have OPT ≤ GFTGSOM + GFTGBOM. 2
Finally, by combining Theorem 2 with Theorem 4, we have constructed a simple, IR, BIC and SBB
mechanism whose GFT is at least OPT2 .
Theorem 5. In any double auction with arbitrary buyer and seller value distributions and arbitrary downward-
closed feasibility constraint F , we can design an IR, BIC, SBB mechanism whose GFT is at least OPT2 .
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6 Transformation to SBB Mechanisms
In this section, we argue how to transform an IR, BIC and ex-ante WBB mechanism to an IR, BIC and SBB
mechanism without changing the allocation rule. Clearly, the GFT remains the same after the transformation.
We want to emphasize that all transformations in this section are not restricted to double auctions and can
be applied to general two-sided markets.
We first clarify the definition of a mechanism M = (xB, xS , pB, pS) used in Section 6, for a general
two-sided market. For every type profile (b, s), for every buyer i ∈ [n] (or seller j ∈ [m]), xBi (b, s) (or
xSj (b, s)) describes the allocation rule for buyer i (or seller j) under this type profile. For example, in the two
sided-market with multiple heterogeneous items, xBi (b, s) contains the probability for buyer i to receive any
subset of items. We use vBi (x
B
i (b, s)) (or v
S
j (x
S
j (b, s))) to denote buyer i’s (or seller j’s) expected value of
the allocation under the type profile (b, s).
If a mechanism is ex-ante WBB, the sum of buyers’ expected payment is larger than the sum of sellers’
expected gains. While fixing the allocation rule, if we simply give the surplus to each seller evenly in the end
of the mechanism, the utility of any agent does not decrease under any type profile, hence the mechanism
remains to be IR. Also, since the surplus is distributed evenly and independent of the reported type, the
mechanism is still BIC. The following lemma provides the transformation from an arbitrary IR, BIC, ex-
ante WBB mechanism to an IR, BIC, ex-ante SBB mechanism.
Lemma 11. Given an IR, BIC, ex-ante WBB mechanism M = (xB, xS , pB, pS) with non-negative payment
rule, there exists another non-negative payment rule (pB
′
, pS
′
) such that mechanismM ′ = (xB, xS , pB′ , pS′)
is IR, BIC and ex-ante SBB.
Proof. Let δ = Eb,s
[∑n
i=1 p
B
i (b, s)−
∑m
j=1 p
S
j (b, s)
]
≥ 0. Define (pB′ , pS′) as follows: for every b, s,
pB
′
(b, s) = pB(b, s) ≥ 0, pS′(b, s) = pS(b, s) + δm ≥ 0. Then
Eb,s
 n∑
i=1
pB
′
i (b, s)−
m∑
j=1
pS
′
j (b, s)
 = Eb,s
 n∑
i=1
pBi (b, s)−
m∑
j=1
pSj (b, s)
−m · δ
m
= 0 (18)
M ′ is ex-ante SBB. In mechanism M ′, it first gives δm to each seller and then follows the allocation rule
and payment of mechanism M . Since each seller receives a fixed amount of money at the beginning of the
mechanism, M ′ will still be IR and BIC.
The next theorem provides a transformation for turning an IR, BIC, ex-ante SBB mechanism to a SBB
mechanism without modifying the allocation rule.
Theorem 6. Given an IR, BIC and ex-ante SBB mechanism M = (xB, xS , pB, pS) with non-negative
payment rule, there exists another non-negative payment rule (pB
′
, pS
′
) such that the mechanism M ′ =
(xB, xS , pB
′
, pS
′
) is IR, BIC and SBB.
Proof. We will construct pB
′
such that for every buyer i and her type bi, the expected payment for buyer i
to report type bi in M ′ is the same as her payment in M . Formally,
Eb−i,s
[
pB
′
i (bi, b−i, s)
]
= Eb−i,s
[
pBi (bi, b−i, s)
]
.
Similarly, for each seller j and her type sj , the expected gains for seller j to report type sj in M ′ is the same
as her gains in M , that is,
Es−j ,b
[
pS
′
j (b, sj , s−j)
]
= Es−j ,b
[
pSj (b, sj , s−j)
]
.
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This property guarantees that the expected utility for buyer i (or seller j) when reporting type bi (or type
sj) stays unchanged. Since M is BIC and IR, M ′ is also BIC and IR.
Suppose we are given an IR, BIC and ex-ante SBB mechanism M = (xB, xS , pB, pS). Define the
payment rule (pB
′
, pS
′
) as follows. Let ΩB =
{
i ∈ [n] : Eb′,s′ [pBi (b′, s′)] > 0
}
and ΩS = {j ∈ [m] :
Eb′,s′ [pSj (b′, s′)] > 0}.
For i 6∈ ΩB , since all payments pBi (b′, s′) are non-negative, we must have pBi (b′, s′) = 0 for all b′, s′.
We define pB
′
i (b, s) = 0 for every type profile (b, s). Similarly, for j 6∈ ΩS , let pS
′
j (b, s) = 0 for every type
profile (b, s). We use pBi (bi) to denote Eb−i,s
[
pBi (bi, b−i, s)
]
and pSj (sj) to denote Es−j ,b
[
pSj (b, sj , s−j)
]
.
For i ∈ ΩB and j ∈ ΩS , define
pB
′
i (b, s) =
∏
i′∈ΩB p
B
i′ (bi′) ·
∏
j′∈ΩS p
S
j′(sj′)∏
i′∈ΩB Eb′,s′ [pBi′ (b′, s′)] ·
∏
j′∈ΩS Eb′,s′ [pSj′(b′, s′)]
· Eb′,s′ [pBi (b′, s′)] (19)
pS
′
j (b, s) =
∏
i′∈ΩB p
B
i′ (bi′) ·
∏
j′∈ΩS p
S
j′(sj′)∏
i′∈ΩB Eb′,s′ [pBi′ (b′, s′)] ·
∏
j′∈ΩS Eb′,s′ [pSj′(b′, s′)]
· Eb′,s′ [pSj (b′, s′)] (20)
For every b, s, since M is ex-ante SBB,
∑
i∈ΩB Eb′,s′ [pBi (b′, s′)] =
∑
j∈ΩS Eb′,s′ [pSj (b′, s′)], which
implies that
∑
i∈ΩB p
B′
i (b, s) =
∑
j∈ΩS p
S′
j (b, s). Since the payments of buyers (or sellers) that are not in
ΩB (or ΩS) are 0, Mechanism M ′ is SBB. Moreover, for every i ∈ ΩB and type bi, if we take expectation
of pB
′
i (b, s) over all b−i, s, we have
Eb−i,s[p
B′
i (b, s)] =
pBi (bi) ·
∏
i′ 6=i,i′∈ΩB
Ebi′∼DBi′ [p
B
i′ (bi′)] ·
∏
j′∈ΩS
Esj′∼DSj′ [p
S
j′(sj′)] · Eb′,s′ [pBi (b′, s′)]∏
i′∈ΩB
Eb′,s′ [pBi′ (b
′, s′)] ·
∏
j′∈ΩS
Eb′,s′ [pSj′(b
′, s′)]
= pBi (bi)
(21)
If i 6∈ ΩB , Eb−i,s[pB
′
i (b, s)] = 0 = p
B
i (bi). Similarly, for every seller j and any of her type sj ,
Eb,s−j [pS
′
j (b, s)] = p
S
j (sj). Thus, M
′ is an IR, BIC and SBB mechanism.
With Lemma 11 and Theorem 6, one can show that under IR and BIC constraints, mechanisms with
all variants of the Budget-Balance constraint can be transformed to one another, without changing the al-
location rule (and thus not affecting the GFT). Figure 3 describes the transformation between mechanisms
with different Budget-Balance constraints. In the figure, all the simple arrows are directed from a stronger
constraint to a weaker one.
7 Characterizing the Implementable Allocation Rules in Double Auctions
In this section, we characterize the set of allocation rules that are implementable by an IR, BIC, SBB
mechanism in Theorem 7. It generalizes Myerson and Satterthwaite’s result [21] to double auctions. In
particular, their result is a special case of ours when n = m = 1.
Up till now, all agents’ distributions are assumed to have finite support. For simplicity, in Theorem 7
we assume all agents have continuous distributions. In other words, for every buyer i (or seller j), fBi (·) (of
fSj (·)) is a continuous function and positive in its domain [bi, bi] (or [sj , sj ]).
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Figure 3: Transformation between Mechanisms with Different BB Constraints
Theorem 7. Given an allocation rule x = (xB, xS), there exists payment rule (pB, pS) such that the
mechanism M = (xB, xS , pB, pS) is IR, BIC and SBB if and only if
• For every i, xBi (bi) is non-decreasing on bi. For every j, xSj (sj) is non-increasing on sj .
•
Eb,s
 n∑
i=1
xBi (b, s) · ϕi(bi)−
m∑
j=1
xSj (b, s) · τj(sj)
 ≥ 0 (22)
Proof of Theorem 7:
The following lemma characterizes the payments in an IR, BIC mechanism. The proof is similar to the
analysis for bilateral trading in [22].
Lemma 12. Suppose a mechanism M = (xB, xS , pB, pS) is IR and BIC, then
• For every i, xBi (bi) is non-decreasing on bi. For every j, xSj (sj) is non-increasing on sj .
• For every buyer i and any of her type bi,
pBi (bi) = bi · xBi (bi)−
∫ bi
bi
xBi (t)dt− θi, (23)
θi is some non-negative constant.
• For every seller j and any of her type sj ,
pSj (sj) = sj · xSj (sj) +
∫ sj
sj
xSj (t)dt+ ηj , (24)
ηj is some non-negative constant.
Furthermore, if (pB, pS) satisfies Equation (23) and (24), then
n∑
i=1
Ebi [p
B
i (bi)]−
m∑
j=1
Esj [p
S
j (sj)] = Eb,s
 n∑
i=1
xBi (b, s) · ϕi(bi)−
m∑
j=1
xSj (b, s) · τj(sj)

−
 n∑
i=1
θi +
m∑
j=1
ηj
 (25)
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Proof. For every i and bi, let UBi (bi) be buyer i’s expected utility when she reports her true type bi. Since
M is BIC, for every buyer i, and two types bi, b′i ∈ [bi, bi],
UBi (bi) = bi · xBi (bi)− pBi (bi) ≥ bi · xBi (b′i)− pBi (b′i)
UBi (b
′
i) = b
′
i · xBi (b′i)− pBi (b′i) ≥ b′i · xBi (bi)− pBi (bi)
The two inequalities imply
(b′i − bi) · xBi (bi) ≤ UBi (b′i)− UBi (bi) ≤ (b′i − bi) · xBi (b′i)
when b′i > bi, x
B
i (b
′
i) ≥ xBi (bi). xBi (bi) is non-decreasing on bi and thus Riemann integrable. Let
b′i = bi + ,
 · xBi (bi) ≤ UBi (bi + )− UBi (bi) ≤  · xBi (bi + ) (26)
For any value z, taking integral of bi on [bi, z] and let → 0, we have
UBi (z) = U
B
i (bi) +
∫ z
bi
xBi (bi)dbi (27)
pBi (z) = z · xBi (z)−
∫ z
bi
xBi (bi)dbi − UBi (bi) (28)
Clearly, UBi (bi) ≥ 0, as M is interim IR. Equation (23) follows from setting θi = UBi (bi). Similarly,
we can show that Equation (24) holds for every j.
Furthermore, for every i, by Equation (23),
Ebi [p
B
i (bi)] =
∫ bi
bi
bix
B
i (bi)f
B
i (bi)dbi −
∫ bi
bi
∫ bi
bi
xBi (t)f
B
i (bi)dtdbi − θi
=
∫ bi
bi
bix
B
i (bi)f
B
i (bi)dbi −
∫ bi
bi
xBi (t)
∫ bi
t
fBi (bi)dbidt− θi
=
∫ bi
bi
bix
B
i (bi)f
B
i (bi)dbi −
∫ bi
bi
xBi (bi)
(
1− FBi (bi)
)
dbi − θi
=
∫ bi
bi
ϕi(bi)x
B
i (bi)f
B
i (bi)dbi − θi
(29)
Similarly, for every seller j, by Equation (24),
Esj [p
S
j (sj)] =
∫ sj
sj
sjx
S
j (sj)f
S
j (sj)dsj +
∫ sj
sj
∫ sj
sj
xSj (t)f
S
j (sj)dtdsj + ηj
=
∫ sj
sj
sjx
S
j (sj)f
S
j (sj)dsj
∫ sj
sj
xSj (t)
∫ t
sj
fSj (sj)dsjdt+ ηj
=
∫ sj
sj
sjx
S
j (sj)f
S
j (sj)dsj
∫ sj
sj
xSj (sj)F
S
j (sj)dsj + ηj
=
∫ sj
sj
τj(sj)x
S
j (sj)f
S
j (sj)dsj + θj
(30)
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Equation (25) directly follows from the two equations above.
If there exists a payment rule (pB, pS) such that the mechanism M = (xB, xS , pB, pS) is IR, BIC and
SBB, by Lemma 12, x is monotone and there exists non-negative θi’s and ηj’s such that Equation (25) holds.
Since M is SBB,
Eb,s
 n∑
i=1
xBi (b, s) · ϕi(bi)−
m∑
j=1
xSj (b, s) · τj(sj)
 = n∑
i=1
θi +
m∑
j=1
ηj ≥ 0 (31)
If the given allocation rule x is monotone, and satisfies Inequality (22), define payment rule p = (pB, pS)
as follows:
pBi (b, s) = bi · xBi (b, s)−
∫ bi
bi
xBi (t, b−i, s)dt (32)
pSj (b, s) = sj · xSj (b, s) +
∫ sj
sj
xSj (b, t, s−j)dt (33)
This is a threshold payment and thus M = (x, p) is DSIC and IR. According to Equation (25) and
Inequality (22), M is ex-ante WBB. By Lemma 11 and Theorem 6, there exists payment rule (pB
′
, pS
′
)
such that M ′ = (xB, xS , pB′ , pS′) is IR, BIC, and SBB. 2
References
[1] Moshe Babaioff, Nicole Immorlica, Brendan Lucier, and S. Matthew Weinberg. A Simple and Ap-
proximately Optimal Mechanism for an Additive Buyer. In the 55th Annual IEEE Symposium on
Foundations of Computer Science (FOCS), 2014. 1.2
[2] Liad Blumrosen and Shahar Dobzinski. (almost) efficient mechanisms for bilateral trading. CoRR,
abs/1604.04876, 2016. 1, 1.1
[3] Liad Blumrosen and Yehonatan Mizrahi. Approximating gains-from-trade in bilateral trading. In Web
and Internet Economics - 12th International Conference, WINE 2016, Montreal, Canada, December
11-14, 2016, Proceedings, pages 400–413, 2016. 1.1, 2, 1.2
[4] Yang Cai, Nikhil R. Devanur, and S. Matthew Weinberg. A duality based unified approach to bayesian
mechanism design. In the 48th Annual ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing (STOC), 2016.
(document), 4, 1.2, 3.1, 1, 3.2, A
[5] Yang Cai and Zhiyi Huang. Simple and Nearly Optimal Multi-Item Auctions. In the 24th Annual
ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms (SODA), 2013. 1.2
[6] Yang Cai and Mingfei Zhao. Simple mechanisms for subadditive buyers via duality. In the 49th Annual
ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing (STOC), 2017. 1.2
[7] Shuchi Chawla, Jason D. Hartline, and Robert D. Kleinberg. Algorithmic Pricing via Virtual Valua-
tions. In the 8th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce (EC), 2007. 1.2
23
[8] Shuchi Chawla, Jason D. Hartline, David L. Malec, and Balasubramanian Sivan. Multi-Parameter
Mechanism Design and Sequential Posted Pricing. In the 42nd ACM Symposium on Theory of Com-
puting (STOC), 2010. 1.2
[9] Riccardo Colini-Baldeschi, Bart de Keijzer, Stefano Leonardi, and Stefano Turchetta. Approximately
efficient double auctions with strong budget balance. In Proceedings of the Twenty-Seventh Annual
ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms, SODA 2016, Arlington, VA, USA, January 10-12,
2016, pages 1424–1443, 2016. 1, 1.2
[10] Riccardo Colini-Baldeschi, Paul W. Goldberg, Bart de Keijzer, Stefano Leonardi, Tim Roughgar-
den, and Stefano Turchetta. Approximately efficient two-sided combinatorial auctions. CoRR,
abs/1611.05342, 2016. 1, 1.2
[11] Paul Du¨tting, Tim Roughgarden, and Inbal Talgam-Cohen. Modularity and greed in double auctions.
In ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, EC ’14, Stanford , CA, USA, June 8-12, 2014,
pages 241–258, 2014. 1, 1.2
[12] Alon Eden, Michal Feldman, Ophir Friedler, Inbal Talgam-Cohen, and S. Matthew Weinberg. The
competition complexity auctions: A bulow-klemperer result for multi-dimensional bidders. Proceed-
ings of the Eighteenth ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, EC ’17, 2017. 1.2
[13] Alon Eden, Michal Feldman, Ophir Friedler, Inbal Talgam-Cohen, and S. Matthew Weinberg. A simple
and approximately optimal mechanism for a buyer with complements. Proceedings of the Eighteenth
ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, EC ’17, 2017. 1.2
[14] Drew Fudenberg, Markus Mobius, and Adam Szeidl. Existence of equilibrium in large double auctions.
Journal of Economic theory, 133(1):550–567, 2007. 1.2
[15] Sergiu Hart and Noam Nisan. Approximate Revenue Maximization with Multiple Items. In the 13th
ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce (EC), 2012. 1.2
[16] Jason D. Hartline and Tim Roughgarden. Simple versus optimal mechanisms. In ACM Conference on
Electronic Commerce, pages 225–234, 2009. 1.2
[17] Xinye Li and Andrew Chi-Chih Yao. On revenue maximization for selling multiple independently
distributed items. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 110(28):11232–11237, 2013. 1.2
[18] Preston R McAfee. The gains from trade under fixed price mechanisms. Applied Economics Research
Bulletin, 1(1):1–10, 2008. 1, 1.2
[19] R Preston McAfee. A dominant strategy double auction. Journal of economic Theory, 56(2):434–450,
1992. 1.2
[20] Paul Milgrom and Ilya Segal. Deferred-acceptance heuristic auctions. Working Paper, 2013.
http://www.stanford.edu/ isegal/heuristic.pdf. 1.2
[21] Roger B. Myerson. Optimal Auction Design. Mathematics of Operations Research, 6(1):58–73, 1981.
1, 1.1, 4, 7
[22] Roger B Myerson and Mark A Satterthwaite. Efficient mechanisms for bilateral trading. Journal of
economic theory, 29(2):265–281, 1983. (document), 1, 5, 7
24
[23] Aldo Rustichini, Mark A Satterthwaite, and Steven R Williams. Convergence to efficiency in a simple
market with incomplete information. Econometrica: Journal of the Econometric Society, pages 1041–
1063, 1994. 1.2
[24] Mark A Satterthwaite and Steven R Williams. The optimality of a simple market mechanism. Econo-
metrica, 70(5):1841–1863, 2002. 1.2
[25] William Vickrey. Counterspeculation, auctions, and competitive sealed tenders. The Journal of Fi-
nance, 16(1):8–37, 1961. 1
[26] Robert Wilson. Incentive efficiency of double auctions. Econometrica: Journal of the Econometric
Society, pages 1101–1115, 1985. 1.2
[27] Andrew Chi-Chih Yao. An n-to-1 bidder reduction for multi-item auctions and its applications. In
SODA, 2015. 1.2
25
A Missing Proofs from Section 3.2
Proof of Lemma 3:
For any buyer i, if DBi is irregular, i.e., ϕi(·) is not monotonically non-decreasing, we iron the virtual
value function ΦBi (bi) as in [4]: for every bi, b
′
i such that bi < b
′
i but Φ
B
i (bi)−bi > ΦBi (b′i)−b′i, we add a loop
between bi and b′i with proper weight w. Then by Definition 2, Φ
B
i (bi) decreases by
w·(b′i−bi)
fBi (bi)
while ΦBi (b
′
i)
increases by w·(b
′
i−bi)
fBi (b
′
i)
. By choosing an appropriate weight w, we can make ΦBi (bi) − bi = ΦBi (b′i) − b′i. If
we keep adding loops, we can make sure ΦBi (bi) − bi is monotone, and it equals to the Myerson’s ironed
virtual value function ϕ˜i(bi) as defined in [4].
For any seller j, if DSj is irregular, i.e., τj(·) is not monotonically non-decreasing, we iron the virtual
value function ΦSj (sj) in the following way: for every sj , s
′
j such that sj > s
′
j but Φ
S
j (sj)−sj < ΦSj (s′j)−s′j ,
we add a loop between sj and s′j with proper weight w. Then by Definition 2, Φ
S
j (sj) increases by
w·(sj−s′j)
fSj (sj)
while ΦSj (s
′
j) decreases by
w·(sj−s′j)
fSj (s
′
j)
. If we choosew appropriately, we can make ΦSj (sj)−sj = ΦSj (s′j)−s′j .
If we keep adding loops, we can make sure ΦSj (sj)− sj is monotone, and ΦSj (sj)− sj = α · τ˜j(sj), where
τ˜j(sj) is the Myerson’s ironed virtual value function for the seller defined as follows.
Let F (·) be cdf for DSj . Define U(q) = q · F−1(q) for any q ∈ [0, 1]. It is not hard to show that when
τj(sj) is not monotone U(q) is not convex. Let {α1, ..., αK} be the support set ofDSj , α1 < α2 < ... < αK .
For every k ∈ [K], define U˜(F (αk)) as follows:
U˜(F (αk)) = min
k1,k2∈[K]
(
δ · U(F (αk1)) + (1− δ) · U(F (αk2)
)
(34)
where δ ∈ [0, 1] is the unique value such that F (αk) = δ · F (αk1) + (1− δ) · F (αk2).
With the definition above, the set of points (F (sj), U˜(F (sj))) forms a convex curve and stays below the
original points (F (sj), U(F (sj))). The ironed virtual value is then defined as
τ˜j(αk) =
U˜(F (αk))− U˜(F (αk−1))
F (αk)− F (αk−1) (35)
for 2 ≤ k ≤ K and τ˜j(α1) = τj(α1) = α1. Then τ˜j(·) is a monotonically non-decreasing function.
2
B Missing Proofs from Section 4
Proof of Lemma 5: If DB is regular, ϕ˜(b) = ϕ(b) for all b. By the definition of Myerson’s virtual value in
Lemma 2,
K∑
r=k
ϕ(βr) · fB(βr) =
K−1∑
r=k
(
βrf
B(βr)− (βr+1 − βr) ·
K∑
l=r+1
fB(βl)
)
+ βKf
B(βK)
=
K−1∑
r=k
(
βr ·
K∑
l=r
fB(βl)− βr+1 ·
K∑
l=r+1
fB(βl)
)
+ βKf
B(βK)
= βk ·
K∑
r=k
fB(βr)
(36)
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IfDB is not regular, consider the revenue curve in the quantile space. For each βk,
∑K
r=k ϕ(βr) ·fB(βr)
is the expected revenue for selling the item at price βk which corresponds to the value of the revenue curve
at 1−FBi (βk). By the definition of the ironed virtual value,
∑K
r=k ϕ˜(βr) · fB(βr) corresponds to the value
of the ironed revenue curve at 1 − FBi (βk). Since the ironed revenue curve never goes below the revenue
curve,
K∑
r=k
ϕ˜(βr) · fB(βr) ≥
K∑
r=k
ϕ(βr) · fB(βr) = βk ·
K∑
r=k
fB(βr) (37)
If type βk does not lie in the interior of any ironed interval, the two curves meet at βk. Hence, the
equality sign holds. 2
Proof of Lemma 6: If DS is regular, τ˜(s) = τ(s) for all s. By the definition of Myerson’s virtual value in
Lemma 2,
k∑
r=1
τ(αr) · fS(αr) =
k∑
r=2
(
αrf
S(αr) + (αr − αr−1) ·
r−1∑
l=1
fS(αl)
)
+ α1f
S(α1)
=
k∑
r=2
(
αr ·
r∑
l=1
fS(αl)− αr−1 ·
r−1∑
l=1
fS(αl)
)
+ α1f
S(α1)
= αk ·
k∑
r=1
fS(αr)
(38)
If DS is not regular, notice that in the quantile space, the ironed revenue curve is convex and never goes
above the original revenue curve. Similarly, we have
k∑
r=1
τ˜(αr) · fS(αr) ≤
k∑
r=1
τ(αr) · fS(αr) = αk ·
k∑
r=1
fS(αr) (39)
If type αk does not lie in the interior of any ironed interval, the two curves meet at αk. Hence, the
equality sign holds. 2
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